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Abstract:
In simultaneous ascending price auctions with heterogeneous goods Brusco and Lopomo
(2002) derive collusive equilibria where bidders divide objects among themselves, while
keeping the prices low. Considering a simultaneous ascending price auction with a fixed
deadline, i.e. the Hard Close auction format, a prisoner’s dilemma situation results and
collusive equilibria do no longer exist, even for only two bidders. Hence, we introduce a
further reason for sniping behavior in Hard Close auctions.
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1 Introduction
Brusco and Lopomo (2002) (BL) consider collusive behavior in a ”simultaneous ascending
bid auction”, i.e. a multi-object version of the English auction (see also Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Kahn 2005). They show that in a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium
the bidders split the markets through signaling their favorite market if private values are
assumed, even if communication is not allowed1. Therefore, collusion in simultaneous
English auctions holds due to a punishment mechanism. Defection from an ”collusive
agreement” leads to a ”bidding war”, resulting in the standard equilibrium properties in
separated English auctions. However, the low-price collusion equilibrium outcome is from
the bidders’ point of view superior to a high-price equilibrium with a ”separated English
auctions” strategy, i.e. bidding in all auctions up to the willingness to pay. Of course the
seller favors the high-price equilibrium.
Kwasnica and Sherstyuk (2007) test this theoretic consideration experimentally and con-
clude that ”collusion occurs in experimental auctions for multiple objects as long as the
number of bidders is small” and that ”outcomes of these auctions, when classified as col-
lusive, often match the BL signaling model quite well”.
This paper extends the literature by investigating whether collusion behavior holds when
the simultaneous English auction is limited in time, i.e. when a ”simultaneous Hard Close
auction” is considered. In this auction format the punishment mechanism disappears and
the fixed deadline turns the bidders’ interaction into a prisoner’s dilemma situation. Hence,
collusion is dominated by sniping, i.e. submitting a bid in the last possible point of time.
The Hard Close auction is one of the most frequently used auction formats in electronic
markets (e.g. eBay) and has been studied both with single goods (see e.g. Roth and Ock-
enfels 2002 ) or multiple homogeneous goods (see e.g. Peter and Severinov 2006 ). Sniping
1BL consider heterogeneous goods with and without complementarities. We just focus on the no
complementarities cases.
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is a widely accepted stylized fact2 and many reasons for this behavior are found: snip-
ing prevents incremental (Wintr 2004) and shill bidding (Engelberg and Williams 2005), it
prevents information revelation in early stages (Rothkopf, Teisberg and Kahn 1990) or late
bidding is due to uncertainty over one’s own private valuation (Rasmusen 2003, Hossain
2006). We find a further possible explanation for sniping: late defection from seemingly
collusive behavior, i.e. to appear to collude early in the auction and defect in the very last
moment.
Section 1 introduces bidding behavior in the separated markets both in the Soft Close
auction and the Hard Close auction. Section 2 sketches the the findings of BL and provide
an analogue approach with hard close auctions. Afterwards we conclude.
2 Separated Soft and Hard Close Auctions
We consider bidding behavior in two different auction formats: the Soft Close auction, the
”online” version of the English auction, and the Hard Close auction. According to the
eBay pricing rule used in Ockenfels and Roth (2006) we model the auctions as a dynamic
second-price format (Fu¨llbrunn and Sadrieh 2006) in which at any time t the current price
is equal to the second highest bid submitted in the previous stage3. The current holder(s)
at time t is (are) the bidder(s) who has (have) submitted the highest bid. In each stage
all bidders are informed on the current price and on their status as current holders. They
are not informed on the bids of the other bidders.
When the auction ends, the current holder receives the item and pays the current price.
Ties are broken by assigning the item with equal probabilities to one of the current holders.
2Evidence on sniping found Ockenfels and Roth (2006), Bajari and Hortac¸su (2003), Anwar et al. (2006)
or Hayne et al. (2003).
3In contrast to their paper we do not use bidding increments. Therefore an equilibrium in weakly domi-
nated strategies holds. Taking bid increments in consideration makes the theory unnecessarily complicated
in our case.
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The payoff of the buyer - the bidder who receives the item - depends on her valuation of the
item. We consider a private value environment and, thus, the payoff of the buyer equals
the difference between her induced private value and the price. All other bidders have a
payoff of zero.
Since the auction is symmetric the distribution of the private values is identical for all. The
private values are identically and independently drawn from a common uniform distribution
that is common knowledge. The bidders face no liquidity constraints.
The Hard Close auction consists of T stages. In the last stage, bidders may submit a last
bid and afterwards the auction ends4. The Soft Close auction consists of at least T stages.
If no bid is submitted in T , the auction ends. As long as bids are submitted in stages
T, T +1, ... a further stage occurs. In this case the auction ends after a stage with no bids.
The terminal stage equals a sealed bid second-price auction. Following the Vickrey argu-
ment (Vickrey 1961 ) the weakly dominant strategy is to submit a bid equal to the private
value. Bids in previous stages are arbitrary as long as the value is not exceeded. Therefore,
the bidder with the highest valuation receives the good and pays a price equal to the second
highest valuation.
In the Hard Close auction sniping, i.e. submitting non informative low bids in previous
stages and bid according to the weakly dominant strategy in the last stage, remains as a
possible strategy and there is experimental evidence for this behavior (e.g. Fu¨llbrunn and
Sadrieh 2006). However, any other strategy yields the same outcome as long as all bidders
place equilibrium bids at some stage and never bid higher5. In the Soft Close auction
sniping is no longer a reasonable strategy due to the extension rule. As in the continuous
English auction format the bidder may engage in bidding wars until their value is reached
or they may bid the equilibrium bid in the first or in any stage. However, with private
4We do not consider bid transfer problems as in Ariely et al. (2005)).
5Actually, any other strategy yields the same outcome as long the second highest bid equals the second
highest valuation and the bidder with the highest value receives the award.
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values both auction formats lead to the same results and the revenue equivalence theorem
holds.
3 Simultaneous Auctions
Two risk neutral bidders (i = x, y) compete for two heterogeneous goods (j = 1, 2).
The bidders’ valuation for each good, vij are identically and independently drawn from
a uniform distribution with limits 0 and 1. Due to a continuous distribution we assume
different valuations and thus, we do not pay attention to possible ties in valuations. Bidders
cannot observe the other bidders’ values. The payoff function for bidder x depending on
final bids βx1, βx2 and βy1, βy2 is (respectively for bidder y)
πx =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
vx1 − p1 + vx2 − p2, if βx1 > βy1 and βx2 > βy2;
vx1 − p1, if βx1 > βy1 and βx2 < βy2;
vx2 − p2, if βx1 < βy1 and βx2 > βy2;
0, if βx1 < βy1 and βx2 < βy2,
where pj is the price in the respective market. All parameters aside from the bidders
private values are common knowledge.
The bidders can submit bids in two simultaneous but separated dynamic second-price
auctions. In the Hard Close auctions both markets simultaneously begin with stage 1 and
end with stage T . In the Soft Close auctions both markets simultaneously begin with stage
1 and simultaneously end either after stage T , if no bid is submitted in T in either market,
or in a stage T + s, if in any stage T, T + 1, ...T + s − 1 bidders submit bids and no bids
in T + s in either market.
We assume T ≥ 3 in order to give coordination possibilities. The lowest bid is at least
b0 = 0 and the bidders have the possibility not to bid, i.e. bidding ω. A bid in stage t by
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bidder i in market j is btij.
3.1 The simultaneous Soft Close Auction
According to BL’s Proposition 0 (p. 8) the separated Soft Close auction (SSC) strategy, i.e.
bidding in all auctions up to the valuation, forms a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. However,
in the second-price environment this means submitting a bid equal to the private value in
an arbitrary stage as long as the auction proceeds or overbid any price as long as positive
payoffs are possible, i.e. the value exceeds the price6.
Proposition 1 (BL, p. 9) established the existence of a symmetric perfect Bayesian equi-
librium which dominates the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in SSC strategies in terms of
bidders’ surplus. A simlpe collusion (CSC) strategy that forms this equilibrium7 is:
- if vi1 > vi2 submit b
1
i1 = b0 and b
1
i2 = ω;
- if vi1 < vi2 submit b
1
i1 = ω and b
1
i2 = b0;
- if, in stage 2, b1xj = b1yj the bidders divide the markets among each other and take no
further action in the following stages;
- if, in stage 2, b1xj = b
1
yj or if in a following stage someone defects from the bidding
instructions given above, then all types revert to the SSC strategy.
Hence, the bidders only submit one lowest bid in the market with the higher valuation. If,
in stage 2, there is no competitor in the market they take no further action in the following
stages and the auction ends after stage T . Therefore the bidders profit equals their highest
valuations. In all other cases the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in SSC strategies evolve.
6Assuming some time costs bidders finish the bidding process until stage T is reached.
7BL assume that E[x] ≥ 12 holds. This condition ”can be interpreted as requiring that each bidder has
to expect a sufficiently high degree of competition from her opponent, should the SEA [=SSC] strategies
be triggered. Otherwise there is no point in colluding, since both objects can be obtained at a low expected
price.” A uniform distribution satisfies this condition.
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Without loss of generality we assume vx1 > vx2. Following the borderline case from
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (2005) the expected payoff for bidder x, if both bid ac-
cording to the CSC strategy, is
E[πx(CSC)] =
vx1
2
+
1
2
⎡
⎣
vx1∫
0
(vx1 − vy1)2vy1dvy1 +
vx2∫
0
(vx2 − vy2)2(1− vy2)dvy2
⎤
⎦ , (1)
where the first summand equals the expected payoff if vy1 < vy2 and the second summand
equals the expected payoff if vy1 > vy2. If both bid according to the SSC strategy the
expected payoff for bidder x is
E[πx(SSC)] =
vx1∫
0
(vx1 − vy1)dvy1 +
vx2∫
0
(vx2 − vy2)dvy2. (2)
Hence, the expected advantage from playing the CSC strategy for bidder x is
E[πx(CSC)]− E[πx(SSC)] = 3vx1 + v
3
x1 − v3x2 − 3v2x1
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.
This advantage is exceeds zero for vx1 > vx2. Hence, the equilibrium in CSC strategies
yields always a higher expected payoff than the equilibrium in SSC strategies.
Collusive behavior leaves lower revenues to the seller8. The expected revenue in the perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in SSC strategies is
E[Π(SSC)] = 2
1∫
0
2v(1− v)dv = 2
3
.
The revenue in each market equals the lowest value. Therefore, the expected revenue is
8We assume a seller valuations of zero.
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two times the last order statistic of two random draws within the interval.
The revenue in the symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium in CSC strategies is (i) zero if
the highest valuations of the bidders are in separated markets, i.e. vx1 > vx2 and vy1 < vy2
or vx1 < vx2 and vy1 > vy2 and (ii) positive otherwise. The probability of case (i) is 50%.
Hence, the expected revenue is 50%*(the expected price in the low-values-market + the
expected price in the high-values-market). The expected price in the low-values-market, i.e.
the object for which both bidders have the lower valuation, equals the last order statistic
of 2 random draws. The price in the high-value-market, i.e. the object for which both
bidders have the higher valuation, is either the second or the third highest order statistic
of 4 random draws with equal probability. Hence, the expected revenue in the symmetric
perfect Bayesian equilibrium in CSC strategies yields
E[Π(CSC)] =
1
2
[
1∫
0
4v(1− v)3dv + 1
2
⎛
⎝
1∫
0
v(12(1− v)v2 + 12(1− v2)v)dv
⎞
⎠]
=
7
20
.
Thus, the seller loses 47.5% if the bidder engage in collusive behavior.
Furthermore collusive behavior can decrease efficiency. Assume for example vx1 > vx2,
vy1 < vy2, and vx2 > vy2: CSC strategies leaves object 2 to bidder y although bidder x has
a higher valuation for this object.
In the simultaneous Soft Close auction with two markets and two bidders collusive behavior
is possible and forms a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium in CSC strategies which
dominates the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in SSC strategies in terms of bidders’ surplus.
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3.2 Simultaneous Hard Close Auction
In this part we show that collusion behavior, especially a kind of the CSC strategy, can-
not be an equilibrium strategy9. Assume a good will ”signaling” (CHC) strategy in the
simultaneous Hard Close auction:
- if vi1 > vi2 submit b
1
i1 = b0 and b
1
i2 = ω;
- if vi1 < vi2 submit b
1
i1 = ω and b
1
i2 = b0;
- if, in stage 2, b1xj = b1yj the bidders divide the markets among each other and take no
further action in the following stages;
- if, in stage 2, b1xj = b
1
yj or if in a following stage someone defects from the bidding
instructions given above, bid bi1 = vi1 and bi2 = vi2 at the latest in stage T .
Contrary to the CHC strategy assume a sniping (SHC) strategy in the simultaneous Hard
Close auction:
- if vi1 > vi2 submit b
1
i1 = b0 and b
1
i2 = ω;
- if vi1 < vi2 submit b
1
i1 = ω and b
1
i2 = b0;
- if, in stage 2, b1xj = b1yj take no further action in the following stages until stage T
and bid bi1 = vi1 and bi2 = vi2 in stage T ;
- otherwise bid bi1 = vi1 and bi2 = vi2 at the latest in stage T .
In the following we assume vx1 > vx2 and vy1 < vy2 because the other cases lead to
corresponding results of the strategies, CHC and SHC.
Therefore, this auction can be considered as a prisoner’s dilemma with strategies C =
Cooperation, i.e. submit a bid in the market with the highest value in the first stage and
9We do not consider side payments.
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take no action further in the following stages if the competitor signals cooperation as well
(CHC strategy), and D = Defection, i.e. submit a bid in the market with the highest value
and take no action further in the following stages if the competitor signals cooperation as
well, but submit bids that equal the valuations in both markets in the last stage (SHC
strategy).
Due to symmetry we consider bidder x. The (expected) payoffs for bidder x depending on
strategy combinations (Sx;Sy) where Si = (C, D) are
E[πx(CC)] = vx1,
E[πx(CD)] = 0,
E[πx(DC)] = vx1 + vx2,
E[πx(DD)] =
vx1∫
0
(vx1 − vy1)2(1− vy1)dvy1 +
vx2∫
0
(vx2 − vy2)2vy2dvy2.
If both bidder cooperate the bidders receive a payoff that equals their highest valuation.
If only one bidder defects he receives a payoff that equals the sum of her valuations and
the other receives nothing. If both bidders defect, the payoff depends on the valuation
constellation in the separated markets. In market 1 the expected payoff for bidder x equals
the expected positive difference between the valuations in that market conditional vx1
is highest and vy1 is the lowest statistic order of the valuations of bidder y. In market
2 the expected payoff for bidder x equals the expected positive difference between the
valuations in that market conditional vx2 is highest and vy2 is the highest statistic order of
the valuations of bidder y. The normal form of the simultaneous Hard Close auction with
collusive behavior is to be found in table 1.
For vx1 > vx2 the expected payoff with mutual defection exceeds the payoff with mutual
cooperation. Thus, the dominant strategy is to defect due to the fact that if bidder y
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Bidder y
C D
Bidder x
C vx1 vy2 0 vy1 + vy2
D vx1 + vx2 0
1
3
(3v2x1 − v3x1 + v3x2) 13(v3y1 + 3v2y2 − v3y2)
Table 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix
cooperates, x is better off to defect because she gains her whole possible surplus in both
auctions, and if bidder y defects, x is better off to defect as well because otherwise she
gains zero payoff. Hence, in equilibrium the expected payoff in the simultaneous Hard Close
auction equals the expected payoff in the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in SSC strategies
in the simultaneous Soft Close auction10.
Hence, due to the lack of a punishment facility in a simultaneous Hard Close auction
collusive strategies cannot sustain. At the latest in T , the bidders are better off to bid
their valuations in both markets, i.e. to snipe. In this setting the seller can increase her
expected revenue by over 90% by choosing the Hard Close auction in contrast to the Soft
Close Auction11.
4 Conclusion
We show that, unlike in a simultaneous Soft Close auction, in simultaneous Hard Close
auctions collusive behavior has no chance to sustain even with only two bidders. Just
before the deadline arrives the bidders can increase their payoff by means of sniping. Even
with communication12 the last stage in the Hard Close auction provides incentives to snipe.
10In Fu¨llbrunn and Neugebauer (2006) we experimentally test whether in three bidders-three markets
simultaneous Hard Close auctions the bidders engage in collusive agreements. Generally, no collusion has
been found.
11The expected revenue in the Soft Close auction is 7/20 and in the Hard Close auction 2/3. The relative
increase in expected revenue is 2/3*20/7 - 1 = 90.48.
12For experimental evidence in multiple object auctions with communication see Sherstyuk (2002) or
Kwasnica (2000).
11
In infinitely repeated simultaneous auctions, collusion facilities may sustain (see Kwascnica
and Sherstyuk 2007), but in finitely repeated auctions the backward induction argument
holds and with the first auction the bidders defect. Hence, if the seller has the possibility
to choose the auction format she is better off to choose the Hard Close auction.
However, with more bidders and/or more markets the possibility of collusion decreases in
simultaneous Soft Close auctions due to less theoretical collusion possibilities and due to
coordination failure13. Hence, from the sellers point of view the advantage of the Hard
Close auction format decreases, especially when the Soft Close auction format results in
higher revenues14
In this paper we introduce a new reason for sniping behavior in Hard Close auctions.
Bidders signal to cooperate in early stages but defect in the last stage to grab the entire
surplus, i.e. they snipe.
References
Anwar, S., McMillan, R., and Zheng, M. (2006). Bidding behavior in competing auctions:
Evidence from ebay. European Economic Review, 50(2):307–322.
Ariely, D., Ockenfels, A., and Roth, A. E. (2005). An experimental analysis of ending rules
in internet auctions. RAND Journal of Economics, 36(4):890–907.
Bajari, P. and Hortac¸su, A. (2003). Winner’s curse, reserve prices and endogenous entry:
Empirical insights from ebay auctions. RAND Journal of Economics, 2:329–355.
Brusco, S. and Lopomo, G. (2002). Collusion via signalling in simultaneous ascending bid
auctions with heterogeneous objects, with and without complementarities. Review of
Economic Studies, 69(2):407–436.
13For a discussion see Kwasnica and Sherstyuk (2007).
14Some support for higher revenues in Soft Close auctions is found in Ariely et al. (2005).
12
Engelberg, J. and Williams, J. (2005). A license to shill: Incremental bidding and ebay’s
proxy system. Working papers, Kellogg School of Management.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. and Kahn, C. (2005). Low-revenue equilibria in simultaneous
ascending-bid auctions. Management Science, 51(3):508–518.
Fu¨llbrunn, S. and Neugebauer, T. (2006). An experimental investigation of collusion in
hard-close auctions: partners and friends. Working Papers 07024, Otto-von-Guericke
University Magdeburg (FEMM).
Fu¨llbrunn, S. and Sadrieh, A. (2006). Sudden termination auction - an experimental study.
Working Papers 06024, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg (FEMM).
Hayne, S. C., Smith, C., and Vijayasarathy, L. R. (2003). Who wins on ebay: An analysis
of bidders and their bid behaviours. Electronic Markets, 13(4):282–293.
Houssain, T. (2006). Learning by bidding. Working papers, Hong Kong University of
Science and Technology.
Kwasnica, A. (2000). Choice of cooperative strategies in sealed bid auctions. Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 42(3):323–346.
Kwasnica, A. M. and Sherstyuk, K. (2007). Collusion and equilibrium selection in auctions.
Economic Journal, 117(516):120–145.
Ockenfels, A. and Roth, A. E. (2006). Late and multiple bidding in second price internet
auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction. Games
and Economic Behavior, 55(2):297–320.
Peters, M. and Severinov, S. (2006). Internet auctions with many traders. Journal of
Economic Theory, 130(1):220–245.
13
Rasmusen, E. (2004). Strategic implications of uncertainty over one’s own private value
in auctions. Working Papers 2004-13, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business,
Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
Roth, A. and Ockenfels, A. (2002). Last-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-
price auctions: Evidence from ebay and amazon auctions on the internet. American
Economic Review, 92(4):1093–1103.
Rothkopf, M., Teisberg, T., and Kahn, E. (1990). Why are vickrey auctions rare? Journal
of Political Economy, 98(1):94–109.
Sherstyuk, K. (2002). Collusion in private value ascending price auctions. Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 48(2):177–195.
Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal
of Finance, 16:8–37.
Wintr, L. (2004). Some evidence on late bidding in ebay auctions. Working papers, Clarke
University, Worcester MA.
14
